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Table of Contents

550 – Determining the Sentence (Chapter 5)

550 – Determining the Sentence (Chapter 5)
  • 560 Probation (§5B) (for Revocation, see §800)
  • 590 Parole
  • 600 Custody Credits
  • 610 Restitution (§5E4.1)
  • 630 Fines and Assessments (§5E4.2)
  • 640 Community Confinement, Etc. (§5F)
  • 650 Consecutive Sentences (§5G)
  • 660 Specific Offender Characteristics (§5H)
  • 580 Supervised Release (§5D) (for Revocation, see §800)

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§570 Pre-Guidelines Probation Cases

Supreme Court
First Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Ninth Circuit

Supreme Court holds that court may suspend sentence de­spite mandatory two year sentence for per­son who com­mits a felony while on bail. (570) 18 U.S.C. § 3147 provides that any­one who com­mits a felony while on release on bail must be sentenced to at least two years’ imprisonment in addition to the sen­tence im­posed for the un­derlying felony.  In a per cu­riam opinion, the Supreme Court held that neither the language nor the leg­islative history of § 3147 pro­vides any basis for conclud­ing that it was in­tended to affect the power of trial judges to suspend sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 and im­pose probation in­stead.  Rodriguez v. U.S., 480 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 1391 (1987).

 

Supreme Court holds probation officer may search proba­tioner’s home without a warrant. (570) Wisconsin law puts probationers in the custody of the Department of Health and So­cial Ser­vices and permits any proba­tion officer to search a probationer’s home without a war­rant as long as his supervisor approves and there are “reason­able grounds” to believe con­traband is present.  Acting on information from the po­lice that there were or might be guns in the probationer’s apart­ment, two pro­bation offi­cers con­ducted a warrantless search and found a handgun.  In a 5-4 opinion written by Jus­tice Scalia, the Supreme Court upheld the war­rant­less search, holding that it was “reasonable” un­der the Fourth Amendment be­cause it was con­ducted pursu­ant to valid reg­ulations con­cerning probationers.  The major­ity found it unnec­essary to decide whether any proba­tion search on “reasonable grounds” would be law­ful.  Jus­tices Black­mun, Marshall, Brennan and Stevens dissented.  Griffin v. Wis­consin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987).

 

Supreme Court upholds confession to proba­tion officer without Miranda warnings. (570) The defendant was sentenced to probation, one of the terms was that he be truthful to the pro­bation officer in “all mat­ters.”  At one of his meetings with his probation officer, the of­ficer asked him about a rape/murder unrelated to his convic­tion and probation.  The defendant admitted his guilt.  These admissions were without the benefit of Miranda warnings.  They were later used against him at his trial for the rape/murder.  The Supreme Court held that the interview was not “custodial.”  Nor did the pos­sibility of revocation of probation if he were not “truthful” with his probation officer make the statement coerced.  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (1984).

 

Supreme Court holds that Youth Corrections Act sen­tence was not expunged. (570) A de­fendant receives ex­pungement of his convic­tion pursuant to Youth Correc­tions Act only when a court has exercised its discretion to dis­charge the youth unconditionally prior to expi­ration of his probationary term and not merely upon his suc­cessful completion of probation.  Since de­fendant was not discharged from probation early, his prior gun con­viction was properly re­lied on as a prior conviction.  Tuten v. U.S., 460 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 1412 (1983).

 

Supreme Court rules that expungement of conviction did not permit felon to possess a firearm. (570) A de­fendant who was convicted of a state charge punishable by more than one year in prison is “convicted” within meaning of firearms disabil­ities (18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (h)).  This conviction stands even though he received probation, no formal judgment was entered, and his conviction was ex­punged fol­lowing the comple­tion of probation.  Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 459 U.S. 814, 103 S.Ct. 843 (1983).

 

1st Circuit says third judgment properly included probation. (570) In a pre-guidelines case, defendant was sentenced to prison and probation on some counts, and to a five-year suspended sentence on count 30. Two months later, the trial judge realized that a probation term was required by law on count 30. The judge issued a second judgment with a five-year term of probation on count 30. The appellate court then vacated all but two convictions on multiplicity grounds. Count 1 and count 30 remained. In a third judgment, the district judge imposed five years on count 1, and a five-year suspended sentence on count 30. The judgment referred to certain conditions of probation, but failed to specify a term of probation. In a Rule 35(a) motion, defendant argued that on remand, no term of probation could be imposed. The First Circuit held that probation was proper. The third judgment mirrored the second judgment except the judge failed to specifically refer to probation. However, the judge obviously intended count 30 to include a term of probation. U.S. v. Lilly, 80 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1996).

 

7th Circuit finds no impropriety in proba­tion offi­cer’s statements during sentencing hearing. (570) In a pre-guide­lines probation revocation case, defendant argued that the district court improperly relied upon the tes­timony of the probation officer at the sen­tencing hearing.  The proba­tion officer had stated that defen­dant’s particular probation vio­lations made the offenses more aggra­vated, and that he could not think of any­thing to say in mitigation.  He recom­mended a substan­tial period of incarceration.  Defen­dant contended that the probation officer was im­properly arguing as if he were the prosecu­tor.  The 7th Cir­cuit rejected this ar­gument.  The probation officer merely gave his recom­mendation to the judge on the basis of the presentence re­port.  U.S. v. Veteto, 945 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1991).

 

9th Circuit says that under old law, no hearing was required before extending probation. (570) Before 1984, no hearing was required before a district court could extend the probation. Effective October 12, 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 3564 now requires a hearing. However, in this case, defendant committed the underlying offenses in 1985, before the new law went into effect. Agreeing with four other circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that due process did not require the district court to hold a hearing before extending probation in this case because the underlying offense was committed before November 1, 1987. U.S. v. Silver, 83 F.3d 289 (9th Cir. 1996).

 

9th Circuit finds no double jeopardy in 20-year sentence after probation violation. (570) The Idaho state judge withheld imposing judgment, and placed defendant on probation for five years.  Defendant was also ordered to spend 60 days in the county jail.  Defendant later violated his probation and was sentenced to 20 years, with all but the first 11 months suspended, after which he was again placed on probation.  When he violated probation a second time he was ordered to serve the remainder of the 20-year sentence.  In this federal habeas corpus case, defendant argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibited him from being sentenced to 20 years after he had served 60 days in the county jail for the same offense.  The 9th Circuit rejected the argument, relying on U.S. v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979), and ruling that the imposition of a sentence after suspension of judgment is permissible, even if the defendant has served time as a condition of probation. Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

9th Circuit upholds terms of probation re­quiring counseling and notice of convic­tion to employers. (570) As terms of proba­tion, the district court re­quired defendant to undergo psychiatric or psycho­logical coun­seling, and required notice to his em­ployers of his convic­tion of securities fraud.  In this preguidelines case, the 9th Circuit found no abuse of discretion, noting that the terms of probation were permitted either under the Federal Probation Act or the Victim and Wit­ness Protection Act.  U.S. v. Par­rott, 992 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

9th Circuit says pre-Guidelines sentence of incar­ceration on one count followed by probation on a second count was not a “split sentence.” (570) Before the guidelines, if a defendant was convicted of only one count, the only way he could be both incar­cerated and placed on probation was to im­pose a “split sentence” under 18 U.S.C. sec­tion 3651.  Here, the defendant was convicted of two counts, and received four years in cus­tody on the first count, followed by five years’ probation on the second count.  The 9th Cir­cuit held that this was not a “split sentence,” because there were two separate counts.  The district court properly corrected the Judg­ment and Commitment order later expressly to  state that the imposition of sentence was suspended on the probation count.  Accord­ingly, defendant’s sentence was legal, and the district court had juris­diction to revoke his probation.  U.S. v. Stephens, 966 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1992).

 

9th Circuit reverses order for corporate de­fendants to make payments to drug clinics. (570) Four soft drink compa­nies were con­victed of price fixing.  As a condition of proba­tion they were ordered to pay $660,000 into a fund to be dis­tributed to four substance-abuse organiza­tions run by local governments with local, state and fed­eral tax dollars.  The district court justified the payments as “restitution to the community.”  The government ap­pealed, and the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing.  The court held that the Proba­tion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed in 1984), did not authorize a monetary payment to third parties.  The payments could not be justified as restitution because the price fixing crime and the drug and substance abuse pro­grams “are in no way related.”  The court cau­tioned that “the judiciary should not take upon itself the role of selecting beneficiaries of de­fendants’ crimes.”  U.S. v. Blue Mountain Bot­tling Company, 929 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

9th Circuit holds that probationary term be­gan when man­date was filed reversing custo­dial counts. (570) The 9th Cir­cuit held that if a district court sentences a con­victed crimi­nal to consecutive terms of im­prisonment and proba­tion, and if the sentencing court ex­pressly pro­vides that probation is to commence upon the comple­tion of the prison term, and if the an­chor term of im­prisonment is subsequently overturned on appeal, then pro­bation com­mences, as a matter of law, when the ap­pellate court’s mandate is filed with the district court.  Thus the ap­pellant’s term of probation began after his sentence was re­versed on the impris­onment counts, not on the day of the original sentencing.  Accordingly he was still on proba­tion when his probation was revoked.  U.S. v. Free­man, 922 F.2d 1393  (9th Cir. 1991).

 

9th Circuit finds no basis for granting credit for pre­trial “probation.” (570) Defendant ar­gued that he should be given credit for “probation” served during pretrial re­lease and during release pending appeal.  The 9th Cir­cuit found “no basis in law or in fact” for this argu­ment.  18 U.S.C. § 3568 grants credit for time served in pretrial custody, but there is no authority for granting credit for time served on pretrial probation.  Moreover federal case law “overwhelmingly rejects the notion of credit for release on bond pending trial or appeal.”  A defendant released on bond pending appeal is not enti­tled to credit for time served in “custody” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3568.  Finally, defendant failed to present any evidence that he was in fact “on probation” during this period.  U.S. v. Free­man, 922 F.2d 1393  (9th Cir. 1991).

 

9th Circuit holds general information in Peti­tion for Probation Action gave sufficient no­tice to parolee. (570) Rule 32.1(a)(2)(A) of the Fed. R. Crim. P. provides that a probationer must receive “writ­ten notice of the alleged vio­lation of probation.”  The court upheld as suffi­cient a notice informing appellant that he had violated “Condition No. 2” of his probation by as­so­ci­ating with a convicted felon, and listing general dates, events, loca­tions etc.  U.S. v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

9th Circuit holds failure to disclose probation file to probationer prior to hear­ing was not error. (570) Peti­tioner claimed that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2)(b) was vi­olated when he was not allowed to see his probation file prior to a probation re­vocation hearing.  The rule re­quires “disclosure of the evidence against the proba­tioner.”  No violation of the Rule or due process was found since the file was not used as evidence and peti­tioner was provided the opportunity to cross-examine all of the wit­nesses.  U.S. v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

9th Circuit holds that de­fendant con­vict­ed of import­ing co­caine cannot be given probation or suspended sen­tence. (570) Defendant was con­victed of importing al­most two kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 960(b)(2).  That section  pro­vides that “the court shall not place on proba­tion or suspend the sentence of any person sen­tenced under this paragraph.”  The 9th Circuit held that this language was sufficiently explicit to control over 18 U.S.C. Section 3651 which per­mits a court to suspend sentence or place on proba­tion “unless [it is] explicitly made inappli­cable.”  U.S. v. Cook, 859 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

9th Circuit holds that defendant is entitled to Brady material in government witnesses pro­bation file. (570) The 9th Circuit held that a defendant is entitled to mate­rial in a probation file that bears on the credibility of a significant witness in the case.  Upon request of the de­fendant, the trial court must review the file in camera and release any innormation which would provide a ba­sis for impeaching the credibility of the witness.  In this case, the trial judge followed this procedure.  The ap­pellate court reviewed the file and held that the trial court clearly erred in failing to provide the wit­ness’s en­tire criminal record to the defense.  “The criminal record cannot be made unavail­able by being made part of the probation file.”  A defendant’s conviction on the count relating to the witness was reversed.  U.S. v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

9th Circuit holds that probation search by police was valid even though proba­tion officer was absent. (570) Suspecting defendant of bur­glary, the police contacted his probation offi­cers in two differ­ent counties and ob­tained permission to con­duct a probation search.  Both probation offi­cers stated that defendant was in violation of his probation and both sought warrants for those pro­bation violations.  The police inde­pendently obtained an arrest warrant, and up­on defendant’s arrest, searched his car and house, finding evi­dence which led defendant to confess to approximately 20 thefts from post office vending machines.  The 9th Circuit upheld the searches even though no probation officer was pre­sent.  They found that the recent Supreme Court decision in Griffin v. Wis­consin, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987) was “inconclusive” on this issue, and that on the facts of this case, the proba­tion search was not a subterfuge for a criminal investi­gation, but was authorized by the proba­tion officers for le­gitimate probation purposes.  U.S. v. Richard­son, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

 

9th Circuit holds that courts have equitable power to order expunge­ment of records. (570) Petitioner argued that inaccur­ate information in the presentence report relied on by the Pa­role Commission should be ex­punged.  Federal courts have the equitable power “to or­der the expungement of government records where nec­essary to vindi­cate rights secured by the constitution or by statute.”  However, the 9th Circuit held that petitioner failed to show that expunge­ment was neces­sary.  Be­cause he had been released on parole, the allegedly in­accurate information posed no threat to him.  In addi­tion, he would have an opportunity to challenge the pre­sentence re­port in any future parole proceeding.  Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

9th Circuit holds that restricting defendant from re­ceiving money for speaking or writing about her crime was a proper probation con­dition. (570) De­fendant, a “prominen[t] lesbian and the first mayor of West Holly­wood,” was convicted of embezz­ling federal funds from a com­munity counseling organiza­tion.  As a con­dition of probation, the court ordered her not to “receive any fi­nancial remuneration or any other thing of value from any speaking en­gagements, written publica­tions, movies, or any other media coverage dealing with her involve­ment in this offense.”  The 9th Circuit rejected her ar­gument that this restricted her First Amendment rights, holding that the condi­tion was a proper reminder to the defendant that “crime does not pay.”  U.S. v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

9th Circuit holds that requiring probationer to submit to urine test for drugs was proper even without court or­der. (570) The proba­tion offi­cer ordered the proba­tioner to submit to a urine test because of various fac­tors indi­cating that he was using drugs.  When con­fronted with the results, he admitted drug use and his probation was re­voked.  The 9th Circuit found no due process vio­la­tion even though he was not given notice that he would be sub­ject to such testing.  The court as­sumed without de­ciding that urine testing “constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend­ment,” but noted that proba­tioners are sub­ject to rea­sonable searches upon the probation offi­cer’s reason­able belief that it is neces­sary.  Here the officer had reason­able suspicion to be­lieve the proba­tioner was using drugs in violation of the condi­tions of probation.  U.S. v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

9th Circuit holds that defendant was on pro­bation and parole at the same time, following consecutive per­iods of incarceration. (570) Defen­dant was serving time at Lompoc.  He es­caped and was sen­tenced to 20 days in cus­tody and 5 years pro­bation, consecutive to the sen­tence he was al­ready serving. He completed his sentence and was released on parole which was to expire in September, 1985.  In Feb­ruary, 1986, his pro­bation was revoked for an arrest that occurred in Au­gust, 1985.  The defendant claimed his pro­bation could not be re­voked be­cause he was still on pa­role in August, 1985.  The 9th Circuit rejected the ar­gument, holding that al­though the record was not clear, it is presumed that defen­dant served the 20-day custodial portion of his es­cape sen­tence before being released on parole.  More­over, it is also presumed in the Ninth Cir­cuit that proba­tion runs con­currently with a sen­tence of incarcera­tion and there­fore defen­dant’s probation began when he be­gan serving the 20 days and ran concur­rently with his pa­role term.  U.S. v. Carter, 827 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

9th Circuit upholds sentence to serve 165 days on con­secutive weekends and five years proba­tion. (570) The 9th Circuit held that al­though a sentence of in­carceration followed by proba­tion would be improper, de­fendant’s sentence was proper because it im­posed probation.  Moreover, it did not violate the six-month lim­itation in 18 U.S.C. § 3651.  Although defen­dant would not have completed the 165-day incarcera­tion requirement for about 20 months, he would have been confined for less than the 180-day maximum al­lowed by law.  Shabazz v. Carroll, 814 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended, 833 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

9th Circuit holds that seven-month delay be­tween ar­rest  and final revocation did not vi­olate due process. (570)  The 9th Circuit hold that each of the various de­lays that resulted in final re­vocation more than seven months after the arrest on the proba­tion violation was rea­sonable, and therefore no due pro­cess vio­lation oc­curred.  U.S. v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

9th Circuit holds that upon revocation of pro­bation, it is the At­torney General, not the court, which gives credit for time served. (570) Defendant was originally sentenced to five years, with execu­tion suspended for all but six months.  When his probation was later re­voked, he argued that the judge could only sentence him to 4-1/2 years, since he had al­ready served six months.  The 9th Circuit re­jected the argu­ment, noting that it is the re­sponsibility of the Attorney General, the De­partment of Jus­tice and the Bureau of Prisons, not the courts, to com­pute sentences and give credit for time ser­ved.  U.S. v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

9th Circuit rules that under local rule, proba­tionary term is pre­sumed to run concurrent with incar­ceration. (570) Defendant was sen­tenced to four months in cus­tody with the bal­ance of the sentence sus­pended, placed on proba­tion for a period of five years.  Five years and one month after he began serving his sen­tence, the de­fendant violated his probation, and pro­bation was re­voked.  On appeal, the 9th Cir­cuit, Tang, J., held that ordinarily the inter­pretation of a sen­tencing order is governed by the court’s intent.  But a lo­cal rule for the Cen­tral District of California expressly pro­vides that probation begins upon pro­nouncement of sentence un­less otherwise provided.  That rule mandates reversal here. Defendant had com­pleted his proba­tion before he committed the act for which it was “revoked”. U.S. v. Levitt, 799 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1986).

 

9th Circuit holds that judgment was clear de­spite lack of specificity on when probation would com­mence. (570) Where, as here, the judge says probation will com­mence on release from confine­ment, the normal and probable mean­ing is that proba­tion begins when the defen­dant is no longer incarcerated by ei­ther state or federal author­ities.  But, even assum­ing the judgment was ambigu­ous, the subse­quent de­nial of the motion for release by the sentencing judge was persuasive evi­dence that he in­tended the probation to commence upon defendant’s subsequent re­lease from state con­finement.  U.S. v. O’Brien, 789 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1986).

 

9th Circuit rules that despite 120-day limit for motions to modify, a court may grant proba­tion at any time be­fore sentence begins. (570) Although a court may not modify a sentence after the 120-day period in Rule 35 passes, the court may nevertheless grant probation at any time before the defen­dant begins serving a particular sentence.  Thus, in the present case, where defendant never surrendered to serve his sentence and this went unnoticed for ten years, the trial court did have power to change its original three-year sentence and grant proba­tion.  U.S. v. Karp, 764 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

9th Circuit reverses on ground that search was not a valid probation search. (570) The validity of a state pro­bation search is measured by application of state law.  Here, the defen­dant was not on probation because the judge had originally stayed his sentence and de­fendant was not given notice that the stay had been lifted.  Therefore, the search was illegal.  The “good faith” ex­ception did not apply be­cause the search was strictly a law enforcement tool, without real probation­ary pur­pose.  The case suggests that Leon will not apply to war­rantless searches. U.S. v. Merchant, 760 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

 

9th Circuit holds that privilege against self-incrimi­na­tion does not apply to inquiries re­lating to probation status. (570) In general, a probationer is not entitled to in­voke the privi­lege against self-incrimination in re­sponse to questions about his probation sta­tus.  See Min­nesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984).  U.S. v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

9th Circuit holds that certified copy of convic­tion was sufficient ba­sis for probation revoca­tion. (570) A certi­fied copy of the defendant’s subsequent local con­victions constituted suffi­cient proof of a proba­tion violation.  The fact that the convictions were based on guilty pleas that may have been taken in violation of Boykin v. Alabama did not prevent the court from re­lying on them when re­voking probation, since the defendant made no claim that he did not commit the offenses.  U.S. v. Garcia, 771 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

9th Circuit upholds probation violation war­rant despite delay in executing it. (570) The court found no violation of due process despite a four-year delay in executing the probation vi­olation warrant.  Even though the defendant continued to reside at the place shown on his probation records, and filed a change of ad­dress notice with the post office, he showed no prejudice from the delay.  U.S. v. Riggans, 746 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

9th Circuit rules that probation is punish­ment for dou­ble jeopardy purposes. (570) Probation is punish­ment within the double jeopardy clause, so it was er­ror to re­quire de­fendant to re-serve the two-year probationary period that he had already successfully com­pleted while his appeal was pending.  However, he could be ordered to serve the one-year jail term that he had not yet served.  Kennick v. Superior Court of State of California, 736 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

9th Circuit affirms conditioning probation on payment of back taxes. (570) It was proper for the court to con­dition probation on the pay­ment of back taxes for the years for which de­fendant pleaded guilty, but not for a year which was not part of the plea agreement.  It is okay to leave the ac­tual amount to be determined later, where the amount is unknown at the time of sentencing.  It was proper here to revoke probation when defendant failed to make any effort to pay.  U.S. v. Green, 735 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

9th Circuit upholds costs of prosecution as condition of proba­tion. (570) The trial court correctly imposed the costs of prosecution as a condition of pro­bation in this IRS tax case.  U.S. v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

9th Circuit upholds extension of probation upon revoca­tion of ear­lier probation. (570) Originally sen­tenced to three years probation, defendant’s probation was revoked a year later and the probation term was extended by one year.  The court held that this was proper, as long as the total length of the probation pe­riod did not exceed five years.  U.S. v. McCrae, 714 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1983

Browse Contents

  • 100 Pre-Guidelines Sentencing, Generally
  • 110 Guidelines Sentencing, Generally
  • 150 Application Principles, Generally
  • 200 Offense Conduct, Generally
  • 400 Adjustments, Generally
  • 500 Criminal History, Generally
  • 550 Determining the Sentence
  • 700 Departures, Generally
  • 750 Sentencing Hearing, Generally
  • 780 Plea Agreements, Generally
  • 800 Violations of Probation and Supervised Release
  • 840 Sentencing of Organizations
  • 850 Appeal of Sentence (18 U.S.C. §3742)
  • 880 Habeas Corpus / 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motions
  • 900 – Forfeitures, Generally

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